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author | Matt Strapp <matt@mattstrapp.net> | 2022-04-01 17:50:13 +0200 |
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committer | Matt Strapp <matt@mattstrapp.net> | 2022-04-01 17:50:13 +0200 |
commit | 5717af872df070a50b9c27ccb21e2753339ae8fe (patch) | |
tree | 70dc16e57f4e4c552f92810eaf9d16c2dfaa56aa /src/routes/pendulum.ts | |
parent | Bump @typescript-eslint/parser from 5.16.0 to 5.17.0 (#37) (diff) | |
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Attempt to add basic SAML
Signed-off-by: Matt Strapp <matt@mattstrapp.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/routes/pendulum.ts')
-rw-r--r-- | src/routes/pendulum.ts | 266 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 266 deletions
diff --git a/src/routes/pendulum.ts b/src/routes/pendulum.ts deleted file mode 100644 index 66ad594..0000000 --- a/src/routes/pendulum.ts +++ /dev/null @@ -1,266 +0,0 @@ -import { spawn } from 'child_process'; -import cookieParser from 'cookie-parser'; -import csurf from 'csurf'; -import express, { Request, Response } from 'express'; -import fileUpload, { UploadedFile } from 'express-fileupload'; -import { access, stat } from 'fs/promises'; -import { quote } from 'shell-quote'; - -/** - * The endpoint for the API calls involving file uploads and running the files on the pendulum. - */ -const api = express.Router(); - -// Use JSON parser for API requests and responses -api.use(express.json()); -// CSRF protection -api.use(cookieParser()); -const csrf = csurf({ cookie: true }); - -// For file uploads -api.use( - fileUpload({ - preserveExtension: true, // Preserve file extension on upload - safeFileNames: true, // Only allow alphanumeric characters in file names - limits: { fileSize: 1 * 1024 * 1024 }, // Limit file size to 1MB - useTempFiles: true, // Store files in temp instead of memory - tempFileDir: '/tmp/', // Store files in /tmp/ - debug: false, // Log debug information - }) -); - -/* - Upload a file to the server - POST /api/v1/upload - Parameters: - files: The file to upload - Returns: - 201: - { - "message": "File uploaded successfully", - "file": { - "name": "file.py", - "path": "/tmp/file-538126", - } - } - 400 when there is no file - 413 when the file is too large - 415 when the file's MIME type is not text/x-python or text/plain (WINDOWS WHY) - 500 for any other errors -*/ -api - .route('/upload') - .post(csrf, (req: Request, res: Response) => { - try { - // Check if anything was actually uploaded - if (!req.files || Object.keys(req.files).length === 0) - return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No file uploaded.' }); - - const file: UploadedFile = req.files.file as UploadedFile; // Kludge to prevent a compiler error, only one file gets uploaded so this should be fine - - // Check if the file is too large (see fileUpload.limits for the limit) - if (file.truncated) - return res.status(413).json({ error: 'File uploaded was too large.' }); - - // Check if the file is a python file - if (file.mimetype !== 'text/x-python' && file.mimetype !== 'text/plain') - return res - .status(415) - .json({ error: 'File uploaded was not a Python file.' }); - - res.status(201).json({ - file: { file: file.name, path: file.tempFilePath }, - msg: 'File uploaded successfully.', - csrf: req.csrfToken(), - }); - } catch (err) { - // Generic error handler - res.status(500).json({ - error: 'An unknown error occurred while uploading the file.', - error_msg: err, - }); - } - }) - // Fallback - .all(csrf, (req: Request, res: Response) => { - res.set('Allow', 'POST'); - res.status(405).json({ error: 'Method not allowed.' }); - }); - -/* - Actuate the pendulum - POST /api/v1/actuate - Parameters: - file: { - name: The name of the file to run, currently unused - path: The path to the uploaded file on the server, passed in from /api/v1/upload on the website - } - Returns: - 200: - { - "file": { - "name": "file.py", - "filename": "file-538126", - } - } - 400 for when the file passed in is not a regular file - 403 when the file is not accessible - 500: - { - "error": "Program exited with error code 1.", - "error_msg": "NameError: name 'sleep' is not defined", - } - - This route is probably a complete security nightmare. It allows anyone to run arbitrary Python code on the server. - - Minimizing PE vectors like running this as an extremely low privilege user is a must. - -*/ -api - .route('/actuate') - // Snyk error mitigation, should be fine since the rate limiting is already in place - // file deepcode ignore NoRateLimitingForExpensiveWebOperation: This is already rate limited by the website, so we don't need to do it again - .post(csrf, async (req: Request, res: Response) => { - try { - const path: string = req.body.file.path; - // Verify that the file exists and is a regular file - // Return if not since the res will be sent by the verifyFile function - if ((await verifyFile(path, res)) !== true) return; - - const escaped = quote([path]); - // Run the code - /* - TODO: - - Potentially add the limiter to one-per-person here - - Add a timeout - - Communicate to the machine to give up (the user as well), maybe just kill the process? - - Make this more secure - - HOW? - */ - // let output = ''; - let stderr = ''; - const actuation = spawn('python', escaped.split(' ')); - // actuation.stdout.on('data', (data: Buffer) => { - // output += data.toString(); - // }); - actuation.stderr.on('data', (data: Buffer) => { - stderr += `STDERR: ${data.toString()}`; - }); - actuation.on('close', (code: number) => { - const filename: string = (req.body.file.path as string) - .split('/') - .pop() as string; - // Make sure the program exited with a code of 0 (success) - if (code !== 0) - return res.status(500).json({ - error: `Program exited with exit code ${code}`, - error_msg: stderr, - file: { name: req.body.file.file, filename: filename }, - }); - return res - .status(200) - .json({ file: { name: req.body.file.file, filename: filename } }); - }); - // Kill the process if it takes too long - // Default timeout is 120 seconds (2 minutes) - setTimeout(() => { - actuation.kill(); - }, 120000); - } catch (err) { - // Generic error handler - return res.status(500).json({ - error: 'An unknown error occurred while running the file.', - error_msg: err, - }); - } - }) - // Fallback - .all(csrf, (req: Request, res: Response) => { - res.set('Allow', 'POST'); - return res.status(405).json({ error: 'Method not allowed.' }); - }); - -/* - Download the CSV file after running the pendulum - GET /api/v1/download - Parameters: - filename: The name of the file to download - Returns: - 200: (the CSV file) - 403 when someone is trying to do directory traversal - 404 when the file is not accessible or does not exist - 500 for any other errors -*/ -api - .route('/download') - .get(csrf, async (req: Request, res: Response) => { - const filename: string = req.query.filename as string; - if (!filename) - return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No filename specified.' }); - // Make sure no path traversal is attempted - // This regex matches all alphanumeric characters, underscores, and dashes. - // MAKE SURE THIS DOES NOT ALLOW PATH TRAVERSAL - if (!/^[\w-]+$/.test(filename)) - return res.status(403).json({ error: 'No.' }); - - const path = `/tmp/${filename}.csv`; - - // Verify that the file exists and is a regular file - // Return if not since the res will be sent by the verifyFile function - if ((await verifyFile(path, res)) !== true) return; - // Read the file and send it to the client - res.type('text/csv'); - // Snyk error mitigation, should be fine since tmp is private and the simple regex above should prevent path traversal - // deepcode ignore PT: This is probably mitigated by the regex - return res.sendFile(path); - }) - // Fallback - .all(csrf, (req: Request, res: Response) => { - res.set('Allow', 'GET'); - return res.status(405).json({ error: 'Method not allowed.' }); - }); - -/** - * Verify that the file exists and is a regular file so it can be sent to the user - * @param file The path to the file - * @param res The Express response object, used if the file is not accessible - * @returns `true` if the file exists and is a regular file,`false` otherwise - * - * `AFTER THIS POINT, THE API HAS ALREADY SENT A RESPONSE, SO THE FUNCTION THAT CALLED IT SHOULD NOT RETURN ANOTHER RESPONSE ` - */ -async function verifyFile(file: string, res: Response) { - // Make sure the file being requested to run exists - try { - await access(file); - } catch (err) { - res - .status(404) - .json({ error: 'File is not accessible or does not exist.' }); - return false; - } - // This is a try catch because otherwise type checking will fail and get all messed up - // Handle your promise rejections, kids - try { - const stats = await stat(file); - // Make sure the file being requested to run is a regular file - if (!stats.isFile()) { - res.status(400).json({ error: 'File is not a regular file.' }); - return false; - } - // Make sure the file being requested to run is not a directory - else if (stats.isDirectory()) { - res.status(400).json({ error: 'File is a directory.' }); - return false; - } - - // File does exist and is a regular file, so it is good to go - return true; - } catch (err) { - res - .status(404) - .json({ error: 'File is not accessible or does not exist.' }); - return false; - } -} - -export default api; |