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authorMatt Strapp <matt@mattstrapp.net>2022-03-24 10:10:58 -0500
committerMatt Strapp <matt@mattstrapp.net>2022-03-24 10:10:58 -0500
commit9ebb969d03acdc5bb0f80cc1311d73719688542d (patch)
tree83635f17dabdeb0e8629140cb366f00a49c8c3b7 /src/routes/pendulum.ts
parentBump minimist from 1.2.5 to 1.2.6 (#32) (diff)
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Add camera support
Signed-off-by: Matt Strapp <matt@mattstrapp.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/routes/pendulum.ts')
-rw-r--r--src/routes/pendulum.ts266
1 files changed, 266 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/routes/pendulum.ts b/src/routes/pendulum.ts
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+import { spawn } from 'child_process';
+import cookieParser from 'cookie-parser';
+import csurf from 'csurf';
+import express, { Request, Response } from 'express';
+import fileUpload, { UploadedFile } from 'express-fileupload';
+import { access, stat } from 'fs/promises';
+import { quote } from 'shell-quote';
+
+/**
+ * The endpoint for the API calls involving file uploads and running the files on the pendulum.
+ */
+const api = express.Router();
+
+// Use JSON parser for API requests and responses
+api.use(express.json());
+// CSRF protection
+api.use(cookieParser());
+const csrf = csurf({ cookie: true });
+
+// For file uploads
+api.use(
+ fileUpload({
+ preserveExtension: true, // Preserve file extension on upload
+ safeFileNames: true, // Only allow alphanumeric characters in file names
+ limits: { fileSize: 1 * 1024 * 1024 }, // Limit file size to 1MB
+ useTempFiles: true, // Store files in temp instead of memory
+ tempFileDir: '/tmp/', // Store files in /tmp/
+ debug: false, // Log debug information
+ })
+);
+
+/*
+ Upload a file to the server
+ POST /api/v1/upload
+ Parameters:
+ files: The file to upload
+ Returns:
+ 201:
+ {
+ "message": "File uploaded successfully",
+ "file": {
+ "name": "file.py",
+ "path": "/tmp/file-538126",
+ }
+ }
+ 400 when there is no file
+ 413 when the file is too large
+ 415 when the file's MIME type is not text/x-python or text/plain (WINDOWS WHY)
+ 500 for any other errors
+*/
+api
+ .route('/upload')
+ .post(csrf, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
+ try {
+ // Check if anything was actually uploaded
+ if (!req.files || Object.keys(req.files).length === 0)
+ return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No file uploaded.' });
+
+ const file: UploadedFile = req.files.file as UploadedFile; // Kludge to prevent a compiler error, only one file gets uploaded so this should be fine
+
+ // Check if the file is too large (see fileUpload.limits for the limit)
+ if (file.truncated)
+ return res.status(413).json({ error: 'File uploaded was too large.' });
+
+ // Check if the file is a python file
+ if (file.mimetype !== 'text/x-python' && file.mimetype !== 'text/plain')
+ return res
+ .status(415)
+ .json({ error: 'File uploaded was not a Python file.' });
+
+ res.status(201).json({
+ file: { file: file.name, path: file.tempFilePath },
+ msg: 'File uploaded successfully.',
+ csrf: req.csrfToken(),
+ });
+ } catch (err) {
+ // Generic error handler
+ res.status(500).json({
+ error: 'An unknown error occurred while uploading the file.',
+ error_msg: err,
+ });
+ }
+ })
+ // Fallback
+ .all(csrf, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
+ res.set('Allow', 'POST');
+ res.status(405).json({ error: 'Method not allowed.' });
+ });
+
+/*
+ Actuate the pendulum
+ POST /api/v1/actuate
+ Parameters:
+ file: {
+ name: The name of the file to run, currently unused
+ path: The path to the uploaded file on the server, passed in from /api/v1/upload on the website
+ }
+ Returns:
+ 200:
+ {
+ "file": {
+ "name": "file.py",
+ "filename": "file-538126",
+ }
+ }
+ 400 for when the file passed in is not a regular file
+ 403 when the file is not accessible
+ 500:
+ {
+ "error": "Program exited with error code 1.",
+ "error_msg": "NameError: name 'sleep' is not defined",
+ }
+
+ This route is probably a complete security nightmare. It allows anyone to run arbitrary Python code on the server.
+
+ Minimizing PE vectors like running this as an extremely low privilege user is a must.
+
+*/
+api
+ .route('/actuate')
+ // Snyk error mitigation, should be fine since the rate limiting is already in place
+ // file deepcode ignore NoRateLimitingForExpensiveWebOperation: This is already rate limited by the website, so we don't need to do it again
+ .post(csrf, async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
+ try {
+ const path: string = req.body.file.path;
+ // Verify that the file exists and is a regular file
+ // Return if not since the res will be sent by the verifyFile function
+ if ((await verifyFile(path, res)) !== true) return;
+
+ const escaped = quote([path]);
+ // Run the code
+ /*
+ TODO:
+ - Potentially add the limiter to one-per-person here
+ - Add a timeout
+ - Communicate to the machine to give up (the user as well), maybe just kill the process?
+ - Make this more secure
+ - HOW?
+ */
+ // let output = '';
+ let stderr = '';
+ const actuation = spawn('python', escaped.split(' '));
+ // actuation.stdout.on('data', (data: Buffer) => {
+ // output += data.toString();
+ // });
+ actuation.stderr.on('data', (data: Buffer) => {
+ stderr += `STDERR: ${data.toString()}`;
+ });
+ actuation.on('close', (code: number) => {
+ const filename: string = (req.body.file.path as string)
+ .split('/')
+ .pop() as string;
+ // Make sure the program exited with a code of 0 (success)
+ if (code !== 0)
+ return res.status(500).json({
+ error: `Program exited with exit code ${code}`,
+ error_msg: stderr,
+ file: { name: req.body.file.file, filename: filename },
+ });
+ return res
+ .status(200)
+ .json({ file: { name: req.body.file.file, filename: filename } });
+ });
+ // Kill the process if it takes too long
+ // Default timeout is 120 seconds (2 minutes)
+ setTimeout(() => {
+ actuation.kill();
+ }, 120000);
+ } catch (err) {
+ // Generic error handler
+ return res.status(500).json({
+ error: 'An unknown error occurred while running the file.',
+ error_msg: err,
+ });
+ }
+ })
+ // Fallback
+ .all(csrf, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
+ res.set('Allow', 'POST');
+ return res.status(405).json({ error: 'Method not allowed.' });
+ });
+
+/*
+ Download the CSV file after running the pendulum
+ GET /api/v1/download
+ Parameters:
+ filename: The name of the file to download
+ Returns:
+ 200: (the CSV file)
+ 403 when someone is trying to do directory traversal
+ 404 when the file is not accessible or does not exist
+ 500 for any other errors
+*/
+api
+ .route('/download')
+ .get(csrf, async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
+ const filename: string = req.query.filename as string;
+ if (!filename)
+ return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No filename specified.' });
+ // Make sure no path traversal is attempted
+ // This regex matches all alphanumeric characters, underscores, and dashes.
+ // MAKE SURE THIS DOES NOT ALLOW PATH TRAVERSAL
+ if (!/^[\w-]+$/.test(filename))
+ return res.status(403).json({ error: 'No.' });
+
+ const path = `/tmp/${filename}.csv`;
+
+ // Verify that the file exists and is a regular file
+ // Return if not since the res will be sent by the verifyFile function
+ if ((await verifyFile(path, res)) !== true) return;
+ // Read the file and send it to the client
+ res.type('text/csv');
+ // Snyk error mitigation, should be fine since tmp is private and the simple regex above should prevent path traversal
+ // deepcode ignore PT: This is probably mitigated by the regex
+ return res.sendFile(path);
+ })
+ // Fallback
+ .all(csrf, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
+ res.set('Allow', 'GET');
+ return res.status(405).json({ error: 'Method not allowed.' });
+ });
+
+/**
+ * Verify that the file exists and is a regular file so it can be sent to the user
+ * @param file The path to the file
+ * @param res The Express response object, used if the file is not accessible
+ * @returns `true` if the file exists and is a regular file,`false` otherwise
+ *
+ * `AFTER THIS POINT, THE API HAS ALREADY SENT A RESPONSE, SO THE FUNCTION THAT CALLED IT SHOULD NOT RETURN ANOTHER RESPONSE `
+ */
+async function verifyFile(file: string, res: Response) {
+ // Make sure the file being requested to run exists
+ try {
+ await access(file);
+ } catch (err) {
+ res
+ .status(404)
+ .json({ error: 'File is not accessible or does not exist.' });
+ return false;
+ }
+ // This is a try catch because otherwise type checking will fail and get all messed up
+ // Handle your promise rejections, kids
+ try {
+ const stats = await stat(file);
+ // Make sure the file being requested to run is a regular file
+ if (!stats.isFile()) {
+ res.status(400).json({ error: 'File is not a regular file.' });
+ return false;
+ }
+ // Make sure the file being requested to run is not a directory
+ else if (stats.isDirectory()) {
+ res.status(400).json({ error: 'File is a directory.' });
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // File does exist and is a regular file, so it is good to go
+ return true;
+ } catch (err) {
+ res
+ .status(404)
+ .json({ error: 'File is not accessible or does not exist.' });
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+export default api;